The design of data markets has gained in importance as firms increasingly use predictions from machine learning models to make their operations more effective, yet need to externally acquire the necessary training data to fit such models. A property of such markets that has been given limited consideration thus far is the externality faced by a firm when data is allocated to other, competing firms. Addressing this is likely necessary for progress towards the practical implementation of such markets. In this work, we consider the case with n competing firms and a monopolistic data seller. We demonstrate that modeling the utility of firms solely through the increase in prediction accuracy experienced reduces the complex, combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple data sets to an auction of a single digital (freely replicable) good. Crucially, this is what enables us to model the negative externalities experienced by a firm resulting from other firms' allocations. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions for such settings. We highlight how the form of the firms' private information -whether they know the externalities they exert on others or that others exert on them -affects the structure of the optimal mechanisms. We find that in all cases, the optimal allocation rules turn out to be single thresholds (one per firm), in which the seller allocates all information or none of it to a firm. We note the framework and results introduced hold more broadly for the auction of digital goods with externalities.
Introduction
Access to data or information is becoming the key differentiating factor for firms as they increasingly train and deploy Machine Learning (ML) models to improve their operations. Such data frequently needs to be acquired from specialized external sources (e.g. information about customers, satellite images, weather forecasts), which has led to the proliferation of data services that specialize in providing such information. Moreover, all firms exist in competitive structures, and the way such data is allocated and sold should clearly depend on the particulars of the competition these firms engage in. However externalities amongst those purchasing data has been given limited consideration in the literature thus far. The key features that drive the design of allocation and payment mechanisms (which we henceforth call data auctions) for such a setting stems from the nature of data itself: (i) it is freely replicable and so there is no inherent scarcity of it; (ii) it is intrinsically combinatorial, i.e., different datasets (training features for a ML model) sold are bound to have correlation in signal, and so even parameterizing the externality a firm faces from a competing firm getting allocated some subsets of data is in itself a challenging proposition (see Section 2 for details).
The goal of this work is to be a first step towards a tractable formulation of a data auction with externalities. Two desirable properties of such a formulation are: (i) it captures the preferences of a firm for datasets (including externalities) in a small number of parameters, without undue dependence on the number and nature of datasets on sale; (ii) it lends itself to a description of the optimal mechanisms with respect to revenue and social welfare.
Contributions
A Model For Data Auctions with Externalities. We build on the formulation of [ADS19] and demonstrate that by modeling the utility of firms solely through the increase in prediction accuracy experienced, it reduces the complex, combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple data sets to an auction of a single digital (freely replicable) good. The crucial extension to the formulation of [ADS19] is that we model the negative externalities experienced by a firm resulting from other firms' allocations (see Section 2.3). Though a priori one would expect the number of parameters to grow with the number of available datasets, our modeling assumptions lets us summarize each firm's preferences by an n-dimensional vector, where n is the number of firms.
Welfare and Revenue Maximization. We choose to analyze two models which differ in the form of the firms' private information -whether they know the externalities they exert on others or in contrast, the externalities that others exert on them. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing auction and revenue-maximizing auction for the two settings. A key property of the derived mechanisms is that in all cases, the optimal allocations turn out to be single price thresholds (one per firm), in which the seller allocates all information or none of it to a firm. These thresholds can be expressed as simple functions balancing the value a firm receives from a data allocation with the externality that allocation causes on other firms (see Table 1 in the conclusion for a summary). Thus, despite the combinatorial nature of the problem, the characterization of the optimal allocations is such that it suffices to consider the extremal allocations; for each firm, either all data is allocated or none of it is.
Learning. Finally, we consider the situation where the type distribution of the bidders is unknown and has to be learned. We show that the specific form of the optimal auctions derived in this paper lends itself to learning this unknown type distribution using results from stochastic online optimization. In particular we present a no-regret algorithm with respect to the optimal-revenue mechanism (see Proposition E.2 in Appendix E).
Related Work
Economics of Information Goods. There is a rich literature on mechanism design for buying or selling data, in which the value of data is derived from its informativeness in a learning task. For procurement auctions, [GR11] consider a setting in which the buyer wishes to estimate a population statistic while the sellers experience a cost due to privacy loss. In [RS12], the authors consider a similar problem but assume a known prior on the sellers' costs. A budget-feasible regression problem is considered in [HIM14] and [ACHW15] consider an online learning setting. More recently, [BB19, AMMO19] consider the externalities associated with selling data, for example when information about a given seller leaks from the data sold by a different seller.
In [BCTS19, AP86], the authors consider a related problem of selling information goods in a competitive environment and find that the optimal selling strategy crucially depends on the form of the competition, thus motivating studying the effect of interdependent valuation functions. Contrary to them, we consider an auction setting instead of assuming that the seller has complete knowledge of the competition structure.
Externalities in Auctions. The second line of work related to the present paper studies the question of designing auctions in the presence of externalities. The seminal papers [JMS96] and [JMS99] study the same multidimensional additive externality model as the one we present here, and our analysis draws from their results. We also mention the survey [JM06] by the first two of these authors as a useful reference. Many papers consider a similar additive model, but often assume that externality parameters are public [AC08, Bro13] or do not depend on the identity of the competitor [BDP17] essentially reducing the auction to the single dimensional setting. Closest to our work is [DP11] which extended the setting of [JMS96] to the situation where K copies of the same indivisible item are being sold. However, their focus was on quantifying the effect of changing the parameter K. Finally, we mention [HIMM13, ZWWB18] which consider single-dimensional non-additive models of externalities yielding tractable auctions.
Organization of Paper
In Section 2, we motivate and formulate the utility model of the firms and the auction design setup. In Section 3, we collect known characterizations of incentive compatibility and individual rationality relevant for our setting. In Section 4 and Section 5 we describe the social-welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms respectively. We conclude by summarizing our main findings.
Model
Basics of Model. There exists a single monopolistic data seller that has access to a (possibly combinatorial) "information set", S (e.g., S could be a collection of M training features). Let there be N := [n] firms which engage with this data seller to increase the prediction accuracy of some quantity of interest (e.g., forecasting demand of a good).
A Succinct Bidding Language for Data Auctions with Externalities
Key Challenge -Combinatorial Nature of Data. The key challenge in designing such data auctions stems from the potentially combinatorial nature of the information set S, on sale (e.g., M training features). For example, it is likely the information in a particular feature sold is likely to be highly correlated with other features also sold by the data seller. Hence, without further structure, the number of parameters required to capture the valuation function of each firm (including the externalities due to other firms) is in general going to be exponential in the size of the information set S. For example in the case where there are M features on sale, we would require at least n × 2 M quantities to even parameterize the valuation of each participating firm, likely rendering this auction intractable.
Towards Feasibility -Existence of a Prediction Gain Function. Towards a more feasible auction design, we build on the model of [ADS19] and notice that in the setting where firms aim to increase prediction accuracy, it is natural to make the modeling assumption that their valuation for data does not come from specific data sets on sale, but rather from an increase in prediction accuracy of a quantity of interest (along with that of other firms when there are externalities). Hence, we assume that each firm i ∈ N is parametrized by a "Gain Function", G i : S → [0, 1], which is a function mapping the information set, S, to some quantity that defines prediction accuracy (e.g., 1-(Normalized) Mean Squared Error, R 2 -Accuracy). Note, implicit in G i are the particulars of the ML model that is trained and used to make predictions, through the acquired information. Below we list two natural properties we impose on the gain function G i for each firm i ∈ N .
Property 2.1 (Monotonicity). For any two subsets
Property 2.2 (Normalization). We assume that G i is normalized such that G i (S) = 1 and G i (∅) = 0. Here ∅ denotes the empty set, i.e., no information is allocated to firm i. Property 2.1 makes the (mild) assumption that the gain function G i is monotone in the amount of information allocated. Property 2.2 is simply to normalize the various gain functions, and is without loss of generality.
Allocation of Data
Firm Allocations Are in [0, 1]. Consider a subset S i ⊆ S of data allocated to firm i and define x i = G i (S i ) the resulting gain in prediction accuracy. Because of Property 2.2, we have x i ∈ [0, 1] where x i = 1 denotes Firm i getting allocated the entire information set S, and x i = 0 denotes Firm i getting allocated no information. Further note that by Property 2.1, Firm i's utility will be non-decreasing in x i . Let x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ [0, 1] n refer to the allocation vector to the n firms.
All-Or-Nothing Data Allocations Suffice. Note, since the domain of S can potentially be a discrete combinatorial set (e.g. the power set of M training features on sale), G i can only take on a discrete set of values in the range [0, 1], leading to possible discontinuities in the allocation. We relax the problem and consider allocations in the continuous domain [0, 1], i.e. we will treat in the analysis the allocation x as being able to take any value in this domain. However, if these discontinuities are large (e.g. the information set S consists of a small number of disparate training features), there may not always exist a set S i ⊆ S such that G i (S i ) equals the allocation prescribed by the mechanism, a possible stumbling block. One could get around this by considering probabilistic allocations (see below) or by adding noise to the data (see [ADS19] ). However, we find that even though we relax the problem to the continuous setting, it turns out that the optimal allocations (both for welfare and revenue maximization), are single price thresholds (one per firm), above which the seller allocates all information and below which, allocates no information to a firm. So the mechanism remains realizable for the original problem with discrete allocations and we conveniently avoid the issue of these discontinuities by having to only implement the extremal allocations, G i (S) (i.e., x i = 1) and G i (∅) (i.e., x i = 0).
Extension of Framework to Digital Goods. We note the framework above allows for our results to hold more broadly for auctions for digital goods (i.e., freely replicable goods) with externalities. In particular, if an indivisible digital good, denoted as G, is auctioned, we can interpret x i ∈ [0, 1] as Firm i receiving the good G with probability x i and receiving nothing with probability 1 − x i .
Modeling Valuation with Additively Separable Externalities.
In [ADS19] , the authors make the simplifying assumption that a firm's valuation for data is linear in the gain in accuracy, i.e., there exists a v i ∈ R ≥0 (the firm's private type), such that a firm's valuation for accuracy is given by v i G i (or v i x i in our set-up), i.e., a firm's valuation is simply a scaling of the gain in prediction accuracy experienced. For the setting we consider, where firms experience an externality due to increases in the prediction accuracy of competing firms, a natural extension of this model is where Firm i's valuation for i ∈ N is given as
(2.1)
Here, v i ∈ R ≥0 is the value that Firm i gets from being allocated x i (equivalent to the definition of v i in [ADS19] ). In addition, η i←j ∈ R ≥0 is the negative externality caused by Firm j on Firm i when Firm j is allocated x j = 1. For example, this quantity could be the decrease in Firm i's net profit when Firm j is allocated the entire information set versus when it is not (see also [JMS96, Section I]). We collect the vector of externalities exerted on Firm i by other firms as η i← := (η i←j ) j∈N \i so that its valuation can be written more concisely as
Remark 2.3 (Key Modeling Assumption). Equation (2.1) captures the main modeling assumption made, that the competition structure the firms engage in is additively separable. This could be thought of as a first order approximation of a general valuation function ν i with respect to x, the allocation vector. This model of externality does not capture more complicated non-linear competition structures such as ν i (x) = v i 1{x i > x j : ∀j ∈ N \i}.
Firm Private Type
Note from (2.1) that Firm i's valuation is a function of (v i , η i← ). However in reality, depending on the particulars of the competition structure the firms engage in, the private information a firm has might differ. We call this private information the firm's "type". We consider two natural scenarios: Scenario 1: Knowledge of Externalities Exerted By Others. Firm i's private type is (v i , η i← ). In this case, Firm i has knowledge of the externalities that other firms cause on it.
Scenario 2: Knowledge of Externalities Exerted Onto Others. Firm i's private type is (v i , η ←i ), where η ←i := (η j←i ) j∈N \i . In this case, Firm i has knowledge of the externalities that it causes on other firms.
We find that this difference in what defines the private type of a firm, though subtle, crucially affects the form of the optimal allocation and payment functions.
Bidder Type Spaces and Bid Spaces. Going forward, we use the standard auction terminology and refer to firms as bidders. We denote bidder i's private type as t i ∈ T i , where T i denotes the type space of bidder i. Thus, in Scenario 1, we have t i := (v i , η i← ) ∈ R n ≥0 , while in Scenario 2, we have t i := (v i , η ←i ) ∈ R n ≥0 . We abuse notation and let t i refer to both kinds of private types as it will be clear from context for the remainder of the paper. We further assume the type values lie in bounded ranges:
A vector of types from all the bidders is denoted as t ∈ T . We denote t −i as the vector of all types other than bidder i.
We assume bidders are rational, selfish agents who act to maximize their utilities in a given auction setting. It is possible that participating in the auction, i.e. submitting a valid bid, receiving an allocation, and making a payment, may leave bidders worse off than simply not participating. To give bidders the option of non-participation, we define the bid spaces B i := T i ∪ {∅} and B := Π i∈N B i . Then a bidder can report any type in T i , but can also choose to not participate in the auction by reporting ∅.
Throughout, we use the convention that a "hat" letter denotes a quantity reported by the bidders, as opposed to the "true" realization of the same quantity. For example, t i denotes the (true) type of bidder i whilet i denotes her bid (i.e. reported type). Similarly, t −i andt −i denote respectively the true types and reported types of all bidders but i.
Prior Distribution of Bidder Types. For certain cases we consider, making a distributional assumption on the private types of bidders will be necessary. For those settings, we let the bidders' private types t i be drawn independently from commonly known distributions F i on T i . Let f i be the corresponding density functions for F i , f = i∈N f i , and F = i∈N F i be the joint distribution function of t on T , likewise for the individual parameters v i and η i←j , we denote the corresponding marginal density and distribution functions by f v i , f η i←j , and F v i , F η i←j , respectively.
Auction Design Setup
By the revelation principle [Mye81], it suffices to consider incentive compatible mechanisms where bidders directly bid their type. The auction design problem consists of designing the following two functions to maximize social welfare or the seller's revenue:
• an allocation function x : B → [0, 1] n ;
• a payment function p : B → (R ≥0 ) n .
In short, given a vector of bidst ∈ T from the bidders, x(t) is the resulting vector of allocations and p(t) is the vector of payments required of the bidders. We abuse notation and let x denote both the vector of allocations and the function, which maps bids to this allocation vector. We similarly abuse notation for p.
We assume bidder's have quasilinear net utility from participating in the auction. That is, given a allocation and payment vectors x and p, respectively, and true types t ∈ T , bidder i's utility is
Remark 2.4 (Key Difference From Standard Auction Set-Ups). The key difference from standard single-item auction setups is that for digital goods, such as data, there is no feasibility constraint on the allocation function x(·). In particular, we do not require that the sum of the allocations ( n i=1 x i ), is less than or equal to one. The absence of this feasibility constraint is key in obtaining a simple structure for the optimal auctions despite it being a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem (i.e., each bidder is parameterized by a n-dimensional vector).
Outside Option. When a bidder chooses not to participate in the auction, the auctioneer cannot charge the bidder any price nor 'dump' any goods on the bidder. That is, we have the restriction that x i (t) = 0 and p i (t) = 0 whenevert i = ∅. Note that even if a given bidder chooses not to participate in the auction, allocations to the other, participating bidders can still affect her utility through negative externalities. Thus, it will be necessary to specify what the auction does when subsets of bidders don't participate. However, since we are interested in finding an equilibrium where all bidders participate (and bid truthfully), it suffices for us to explicitly define the mechanism under single-bidder deviations from equilibrium and the equilibrium itself. That is, we seek allocation and payment rules x(t) and p(t) when at most one component of t is ∅. Bidder i's utility when she does not participate and all remaining bidders N \i do participate depends only on others' bids and the true underlying types, and is called bidder i's "outside option". Given a type vector t ∈ T and a vector of bidst −i from other bidders, the utility of bidder i in her outside option is given by
(2.2)
Truthfulness and Participation Constraints
In Section 3.1, we define incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) conditions. In Section 3.2, we then provide relevant characterizations of the mechanisms satisfying these IC and IR constraints, which depend on the form of bidders' private types.
Definitions of IC and IR Mechanisms
Ex-Post Constraints. We first consider ex-post truthfulness and participation constraints. 
Definition 3.2 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality). A mechanism (x, p) is ex-post Individually Rational (ex-post IR) if for every type vector t ∈ T and bidder i ∈ N
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility expresses that no matter what the true types are and what other players bid, a bidder cannot strictly increase her net utility by bidding untruthfully. Ex-post individual rationality expresses that no matter what the true types are, in a situation where all other bidders participate and bid truthfully, it is better for each bidder to report truthfully than to not participate. These two properties combined imply that participating and reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism.
Interim Constraints. In situations where types a drawn from a know prior distribution and bidders reason in expectation over other bidder's private types conditioned on their own observed types, we consider interim relaxations of the IC and IR definitions.
To this end, define
to be the interim expected utility of bidder i ∈ N if she bidst i ∈ B i while having a true type t i ∈ T i , and all other bidders bid their type truthfully. Note that the expectation is taken over a random realization t ∼ F conditioned on the event that bidder's i type is t i .
Definition 3.4 (Interim Individual Rationality). A mechanism (x, p) satisfies interim Individual Rationality (interim IR) if for every type t i ∈ T i and bidder i ∈ N ,
Characterizations of IC and IR Mechanisms
An important step towards elucidating the solution structure of the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing mechanisms is to obtain a characterization of the IC and IR constraints. Since our valuation model has the same form as the one in [JMS96, JMS99], we rely on the characterizations found in these papers, and state them below for completeness.
Characterizations in Scenario 1
For ease of notation, given bidder i's type t i = (v i , η i← ), let us define the corresponding type vector t † i ∈ R n by t † i = v i e i − j∈N \i η i←j e j where e k denotes the kth vector of the standard basis. Note that t † i amounts to a reordering and appropriate negation of t i 's coordinates so that bidder i's valuation given allocation vector x can be written as
For each bidder i ∈ N , we define the overall interim allocation function
Note that y (i) is a vector field mapping T i to [0, 1] n . Finally, for every bidder i ∈ N , we define the critical typet i = (v i , η i← ), which will feature in the following IC and IR characterizations.
Proposition 3.5 ([JMS99, Proposition 1]). Suppose bidders' private types are of the form t i = (v i , η i← ) for each bidder i ∈ N . Then the mechanism (x, p) is BNIC if and only if for each bidder i ∈ N :
where C i is an arbitrary integration constant whose value sets V i (t i ;t i ), the interim utility of bidder i when her type ist i = (v i , η i← ).
We also provide the following characterization of interim IR for BNIC mechanisms that maximize revenue. 
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.1.
Characterizations in Scenario 2
We now consider the case where the private types are of the form t i = (v i , η ←i ) for each bidder i ∈ N . Note that in this scenario, bidder i's expected outside option utility V i (∅; t i ) does not depend on t i . For ease of notation, we define the interim allocation
Proposition 3.7 ([JMS96, Proposition 2]). Assume that private types are of the form t i = (v i , η ←i ) for each bidder i ∈ N . The mechanism (x, p) is BNIC if and only if for each bidder i ∈ N :
where C i is an arbitrary integration constant.
Furthermore, if these conditions are satisfied, then
We provide an alternative (arguably simpler) proof of this proposition in Appendix A.2.
Finally, we have the following characterization of interim IR for BNIC mechanisms.
Social Welfare Maximization
In this section, the seller's problem is to design allocation and payment functions, x(·) and p(·) that maximize the total social welfare, i.e. the sum of bidder valuations:
such that the auction: (i) is incentive compatible; (ii) satisfies individual rationality; (iii) has no positive transfers, i.e. the seller never pays a bidder to participate in the auction. We organize this section by the private types of the bidders according to the two scenarios described in Section 2.4.
Welfare Maximization in Scenario 1
We first consider the case where the private type of bidder i ∈ N takes the form t i = (v i , η i← ), i.e. each bidder knows the allocative externalities others cause on her. We instantiate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for this setting and comment on the resulting allocation and payment functions. We wish to maximize (4.1) subject to DSIC (Definition 3.1), ex-post IR (Definition 3.2), and the feasibility constraint that for all i ∈ N, x i ∈ [0, 1] (Section 3.1). To define ex-post IR, recall that we need to instantiate the outside option, i.e. what occurs if bidder i chooses not to participate in the auction. Here, we choose the natural outside option, that is to run the welfare-maximizing auction with the remaining set N \i of bidders.
Efficient Allocation. Note that by rearranging terms, we can express the social welfare objective (4.1) as
where we let W i := v i − j∈N \i η j←i represent the "welfare contribution" of bidder i, that is, the net contribution to the social welfare, SW, if bidder i were allocated the good. As we shall see, a constant theme for the efficient and optimal mechanisms studied in this paper is that W i , or variants thereof, is the key quantity determining the allocation of bidder i. Since (4.2) is linear in the allocations x i , it easily follows that the welfare-maximizing, or efficient, allocation under the above constraints is simply to allocate whenever W i is nonnegative, i.e.
As was alluded to in Section 2.5, although x i is only constrained to be in [0, 1], the optimal allocation turns out to be one of two extremes: either allocate all data or none of it to a bidder.
IR and the Outside Option. To streamline presentation, let us define the welfare contribution of bidder j when (only) bidder i is chooses to not participate in the auction to be, for j ∈ N \i,
Then following the same reasoning above, the welfare maximizing allocation of bidder j in the absence of bidder i is given by
and the value of bidder i's outside option utility is thus
Note that the welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism does not guarantee that each bidder's net utility will be nonnegative, but rather no less than the utility if the bidder were to not participate in the auction, which could be negative due to externalities.
Remark 4.1. While we choose the outside option to be the welfare-maximizing auction with the remaining bidders, as is natural, we could instead have declared the ensuing auction to have any feasible allocation rule for the bidders N \i that does not depend on bidder i's bid. For instance, a feasible outside option is to allocate all data to every j ∈ N \i if bidder i does not participate, resulting in utility u i (∅, t −i ; t i , t −i ) = − j∈N \i η i←j . This is in fact the worst possible outside option for bidder i, which thereby increases the set of IR-satisfying mechanisms. Indeed, as discussed in Section 5, this worst-case outside option is the revenue-optimal one.
VCG Payment Rule. The payments associated with this allocation rule are for each bidder i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T ,
Note that bidder i's payment is the sum of the change in welfare if she leaves the auction and the sum of externalities she induces in the current allocation.
Proposition 4.2 (Efficient Mechanism, Scenario 1). The mechanism specified by allocation function (4.3) with outside option (4.4) and payment function (4.5), maximizes social welfare among all DSIC and ex-post IR auctions, and has no positive transfer.
A proof of these properties is given in Appendix B.1.
Welfare Maximization in Scenario 2
We now consider the case where bidders know the externality that they would exert on other bidders if allocated the good, i.e. when the private type of each bidder i ∈ N ,
Motivating Interim Constraints. Note that in this scenario, bidder i cannot fully evaluate her valuation of a given allocation x, since it depends on the parameters η i← , which are part of the private types of bidders j ∈ N \i. Therefore, each bidder can only reason with her own realized type t i and the commonly known priors on other bidders' types. It is more sensible, therefore, to impose interim versions of truthfulness (BNIC) and participation (interim IR) conditions (see Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 respectively).
Ex-Ante Welfare Optimality. As a first attempt toward a welfare-maximizing mechanism in this setting, one may try to use the previous welfare-maximizing allocation rule (4.3). Due to Proposition 3.7, however, this allocation violates BNIC when the private types are of the
In fact, any attempt to find such welfare-maximizing BNIC mechanisms will fail. It turns out that in general, no mechanism satisfying BNIC can be ex-post (pointwise) welfare-maximal over all types t, as stated next.
Proposition 4.3 (Impossibility of Ex-Post Optimality). Suppose bidders' private types are of the form t i = (v i , η ←i ) for each bidder i ∈ N . For any joint distribution F of types t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ), let
be the set of allocation functions that satisfy condition (i) in the BNIC characterization. Then there exists a distribution F of types on
A proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix B.2. Since Proposition 4.3 implies that there are distributions in which no mechanism satisfying BNIC can also be welfare-maximizing over all type realizations, we relax the objective of finding a pointwise optimum to one of maximizing the expected social welfare, that is,
(4.7)
Proposition 4.4 (Welfare-Maximizing Allocation, Scenario 2). Suppose that the map v i → v i − j∈N \i E[η j←i |v i ] is non-decreasing for every bidder i ∈ N . Then the allocation rule maximizing the expected social welfare (4.7) under BNIC is
Proof. To solve for the form of the expected welfare maximizing allocation function satisfying the IC constraints, we first express the objective in terms of the interim allocations y i (t i ).
Now, the BNIC characterization from Proposition 3.7 implies that there must exist functions y i :
Noting the linearity of the objective in y i , we find that the optimal allocation rule is
Under the given assumptions,
Finally, note that since we can express the objective function and constraints only in terms of the interim allocations y i for i ∈ N , we can without loss of generality for all i ∈ N , set the allocation rule
Remark 4.5. Note that if we were selling a non-replicable good rather than the digital good of our setting, the feasibility constraint i∈N x i ≤ 1 would couple the allocations and x i would be a function of other bids v j for j = i. 
Consider the auction with the welfaremaximizing allocation rule described in Proposition 4.4, that also runs the welfare-maximizing allocation on the remaining set of bidders whenever some subset of bidders chooses not to participate in the auction. Then the BNIC payment rule with this allocation is given by
Furthermore, IR is satisfied whenever
Proof. The induced interim payment rule q i (t i ) = E[p i (t) | t i ] associated with y i as derived in Proposition 3.7, condition (ii) is
Recall that the constant term C i is set such that the payment function satisfies IR. By Proposition 3.8, it suffices to check IR for any type of the form t i = (v i , η ←i ), for each i ∈ N .
Here, bidder i's expected utility V i (∅; t i ) if she doesn't participate is the sum of the externalities effects from the allocations x j (t i = ∅, t −i ) in the welfare-maximizing auction run with the remaining set N \i of bidders, and given the assumption
Then any payment rule of the form (4.11) with the constant C i set greater than or equal to V i (∅; t i ) in (4.12) will give us an IR mechanism. Finally, since the objective function and constraints can be expressed solely in terms of the interim payments q i , we can set p i (t) := q i (t i ). Under the given assumption that v i → v i − j∈N \i E[η j←i |v i ] is non-decreasing, we can re-express the allocation rule as
The integral term in (4.11) then becomes
Plugging in the above expression, along with the form of the allocation (4.13), into (4.11) completes the proof.
Proposition 4.7 (Efficient Mechanism, Scenario 2). The mechanism specified by allocation function (4.8), and that runs the welfare-maximizing auction with the remaining bidders whenever a subset of bidders chooses not to participate, and uses payment function (4.9) maximizes expected social welfare among all BNIC, interim IR auctions.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.4 and 4.6.
Revenue Maximization
In this section, we focus on the problem of designing auctions that achieve optimal revenue. Specifically, the goal is to design allocation and payment functions x(·) and p(·) to maximize the seller's expected revenue Rev(x, p) := i∈N E p i (t) (5.1) subject to BNIC and interim IR constraints. Note that we can also express the expected revenue as i∈N E E[p i (t) | t i ] = i∈N E q i (t i ) by the law of total expectation and the definition of the interim payments.
Revenue Maximization in Scenario 1
We aim to maximize the seller's expected revenue subject to BNIC and IR constraints, where private types take the form t i = (v i , η i← ) for each i ∈ N . Recall the notation for the interim allocation functions
Independence assumption. For this section, we make the simplifying assumption that the components of each bidder i's type are independent, so the probability distribution function
Proposition 5.1. Suppose bidders have private types of the form
. Suppose also that the distribution F of bidder types is such that the virtual valuation functions Φ i,k (t † i,k ) are nondecreasing. Then the mechanism with allocation rule
and payment functions given in Proposition 3.5 condition (iii) with C i = − j∈N \i η j←i is revenue-optimal among BNIC and interim IR auctions.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 can be found in Appendix C.1. Note that the optimal outside option to set is to allocate all data to all remaining bidders when bidder i does not participate.
Remark 5.2. We are able to prove this result despite the multidimensional nature of this auction due to two assumptions. The first one exploits the fact data is inherently a digital, freely replicable good and imposes no feasibility constraint on the allocation function besides x i ∈ [0, 1], allowing us to effectively decouple the allocations. The second, more restrictive, assumption is that the coordinates of t † i are independent. We do not know if it is necessary or simply an artefact of our proof technique.
Remark 5.3. Observe that the allocation rule given in Proposition 5.1 is similar in form to the threshold functions derived for the two social-welfare maximization cases (4.2) and (4.8) but where the virtual value functions (as introduced in [Mye81]) now play the role of the relevant coordinates of the bidders' private types. As with standard revenue maximization settings, the optimal allocation is in general not efficient, i.e. welfare-maximizing, and allocates the digital good less often to bidders than the efficient allocation. An illustrative example is described in Section 6.
Revenue Maximization in Scenario 2
Recall in this case the private type of each bidder i ∈ N is t i = (v i , η ←i ). Using the BNIC characterization of Proposition 3.7, Proposition 5.4 below shows that the problem of finding the revenue-optimal mechanism can be reduced to solving n distinct optimizations over single-variable functions. Throughout this section, we denote by F v i (resp. f v i ) the cumulative (resp. probability) distribution function of the marginal distribution of v i , for i ∈ N .
Proposition 5.4 (Optimal Mechanism, Scenario 1). For each i ∈ N , let y i be a solution to the maximization problem
where the maximization is over the set of non-decreasing functions y :
Then the mechanism with allocation function x i (t) := y i (v i ), with payment function given by (3.2) and setting V i v i , (η ←i ) = − j∈N \i E[η i←j ], and with outside option defined as allocating all information to all remaining bidders when bidder i does not participate is revenue optimal among all BNIC and interim IR auctions.
The proof of Proposition 5.4 can be found in Appendix C.2.
Remark 5.5. In contrast to Proposition 5.1, Proposition 5.4 does not make the assumption of independently coordinates for bidder i's type. However, it again crucially exploits that data is a freely replicable good.
As a corollary to Proposition 5.4, and similar to the single parameter setting [Mye81], we obtain that under a certain regularity assumption, the optimal allocation rule takes a simple form: set a threshold value for each bidder above which all information is allocated and below which no information is allocated. In other words, the optimization problem of Proposition 5.4 over single-variable functions further reduces to finding n parameters: the optimal threshold value of each bidder.
Corollary 5.6 (Optimal Mechanism, Scenario 2). Define for i ∈ N , the virtual value function
is non-decreasing and define τ i := Φ −1 i (0). Then the mechanism given by
is revenue optimal among all BNIC and interim IR mechanisms.
Proof. Observe that the optimization problem in the statement of Proposition 5.4 can be written concisely in terms of
where the optimization is over nondecreasing functions taking values in [0, 1]. Note that the pointwise optimal function y is given by 1{ Φ i (v i ) ≥ 0} and that this function is non-decreasing in v i if Φ i is also non-decreasing. The result then follows from Proposition 5.4.
Remark 5.7. Again, observe that Φ i is similar in form to the threshold functions derived for the two social-welfare maximization cases (4.2) and (4.8). In contrast to Proposition 5.1, the virtual function is only applied on the valuation v i .
Example 5.8. If we further assume that (η j←i ) is independent of v i , then E[η j←i | v i ] = E[η j←i ] and the last term in the definition of Φ i does not depend on v i . In this case our assumption on Φ i is equivalent to the standard regularity assumption of the marginal distribution F v i of v i (see [Mye81] ). The payments also take the simpler form
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a model for data auctions between n firms in the presence of externalities. Our main modeling assumptions reduce the (a priori) combinatorial complexity associated with data to the problem of designing auctions for a single, freely replicable good, with linear utilities parameterized by n-dimensional types. Depending on what the private type of the firms is, we are able to describe the revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing auctions and find that in all cases, the optimal allocations is to either allocate all the data to a firm if its value for data sufficiently outweighs the externalities it causes on other firms, or allocate none of the data otherwise. The specific way in which this comparison is performed depends on the situation considered and is summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 : Summary of efficient and optimal allocation thresholds for the settings considered in this paper.
We now provide some interpretation for Table 1 . In Scenario 1, we go from welfare maximization to revenue maximization by simply replacing the types (value for data and externalities) with virtual types. This exactly mimics what happens in the standard result [Mye81], where virtual values reduce the problem of maximizing revenue to maximizing welfare. In Scenario 2, a similar reduction holds, but only the value for data needs to be transformed via the virtual function. This can be intuitively explained as follows -in this scenario, the externalities reported by a firm do not appear in the firm's own utility but rather only affect other firms' utilities; hence, we find that the optimal allocations ignore these reports and instead rely on the prior distribution on externalities.
For more intuition, we consider the special case of two bidders with uniformly distributed type parameters in Scenario 1. The revenue-maximizing allocation allocates to bidders less often than does the welfare-maximizing allocation and is in general not efficient. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , where the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing allocations are shown to partition the type space for t into the regions based on bidder 1's allocation. For details, see Appendix D. Note that these results are obtained under different assumptions. The social welfare case in Scenario 1 is an instantiation of the VCG mechanism and requires no assumption beyond our externality model. In Scenario 2, since firms do not know the externality other firms cause on them, they have to reason in expectation about their utility and hence this scenario requires a common known prior on the type distribution.
[AMMO19] Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asuman Ozdaglar. 
A IC and IR Characterizations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. We first show that the optimal outside option when bidder i does not participate allocates the digital good to all remaining participants N \i. We then show that it suffices to check that interim IR is satisfied for the typet i , and finally find the optimal value of the integration constant V i (t i ;t i ).
Optimal Outside Option. The interim IR constraint is essentially a constraint on the values that the constant C i = V i (t i ;t i ) can take. That is, after plugging in the form of the payment rule (3.1), interim IR can be expressed as: ∀i ∈ N,
Maximizing revenue corresponds to maximizing the expected sum of the interim payments q i (t i ) and thus of minimizing V i (t i ;t i ). Since ∀t i , V i (∅; t i ) ≥ − j∈N \i −η i←j , we can maximize the feasible region for IR payments by setting V i (∅; t i ) = − j∈N \i −η i←j with an outside option that allocates to all j ∈ N \i when i does not participate. That is, we set
Sufficiency of Checking interim IR for typet i If the interim IR constraint holds for all types t i , then it clearly holds for the typet i . Now suppose that V i (t i ;t i ) ≥ V i (∅;t i ). Note that given the optimal outside option of allocating to all remaining bidders, we have that for every t i ∈ T i ,
where for the first inequality we used that
and y i ≥ 0 as an allocation vector, the second equality follows from (A.1), and the last inequality follows from our assumption that V i (t i ;t i ) − V i (∅;t i ) ≥ 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. We first show the necessary implications of IC. Writing Definition 3.3 for t i = (v i , η ←i ) as the true type andt i = (v i ,η i→ ) as the reported type, and then vise versa, i.e.
Combining the two inequalities yields
By Lemma A.1 below, this implies condition (1). Note also that the inequality (A.2), by adding and subtracting the termv i y i (t i ) to the right hand side and regrouping terms, can be written equivalently as
. Swapping the roles of t i andt i yields the inequality in the opposite direction, and we have that V i (t i ; t i ) is independent of η ←i :
We henceforth writeṼ i (v i ) to denote V i (v i , η ←i ) for any η ←i , and likewise letỹ i (v i ) := y i (v i , η ←i ). To prove (3), we first note that
Thus, V i (t i ; t i ) is the maximum of a family of linear functions of v i and is thus convex
Further, this implies that
where for the last term we used the fact that
. Now plugging in the following expression for V i ,
and solving for q i (t i ), we get
We next show the sufficiency of conditions 1-3. for IC, by proving the equivalent condition for IC, (A.3). We have that ∀i ∈ N,
where the first equality follows from (A.4) and the inequality follows from condition 1 that
Then, there exists a non-decreasing functionf : R → R such that f (x, y) =f (x) for all y ∈ R d and for all but at most countably many values of x ∈ R.
Proof. By a rescaling and shifting of f we assume without loss of generality that the range of f is contained in [0, 1]. Let us now define S := {x ∈ R : ∃y 1 , y 2 ∈ R d s.t. f (x, y 2 ) = f (x, y 1 )} and for n ≥ 1, S n := {x ∈ R : ∃y 1 , y 2 ∈ R d s.t. f (x, y 2 ) − f (x, y 1 ) ≥ 1/n} and observe that S = ∪ n≥1 S n .
We now prove that |S n | ≤ n. Indeed, consider x 1 < · · · < x m , m distinct points in S n , and for each k ∈ [m], y 1 k , y 2 k such that f (x k , y 2
where the first inequality uses the definition of S n , the equality is summation by parts, the second inequality uses our assumption on f and the last inequality uses that the range of f is contained in [0, 1]. It then follows that m ≤ n, i.e. that |S n | ≤ n, which in turn implies that S is countable.
Definef byf (x) = f (x, y) for x / ∈ S (this definition does not depend on the choice of y by definition of S). Then our assumption on f immediately implies thatf is non-decreasing on R\S. We can thus extendf to a non-decreasing function defined over all of R (for example by right continuity). The resultingf satisfies the stated requirements.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. Note that BNIC implies (A.4), and sinceỹ i ≥ 0, we have that V i (t i ; t i ) ≥Ṽ i (v i ) for all t i ∈ T i . Since V i (∅; t i ) is independent with respect to t i , it is both necessary and sufficient for IR to hold that the IR condition holds for some type of the form (v i , η ←i ), for each bidder i ∈ N . Proof. We show that the specified VCG mechanism (1) satisfies DSIC, (2) ex-post IR, and (3) uses nonnegative payments.
let us temporarily define the following quantities for ease of notation. Note the only quantity varying in the following terms is bidder i's bid, while all other parameters are fixed.
We show that the following expression is nonnegative, which is precisely the statement of DSIC:
For the first equality we used the second expression of the payment rule in (4.5), we regrouped terms and used the definitions of W i , W j for the second and third equalities. The final inequality holds because
and likewise for 1(W j ≥ 0) − 1(Ŵ j ≥ 0), implies that each term in the summation is nonnegative.
Let t be an arbitrary type realization. Showing ex-post IR is equivalent to showing
Plugging in the payment rule, we get the equivalent inequality
Rearranging and regrouping terms, we get that this is equivalent to
, the first term is always nonnegative. The terms in the summation are likewise nonnegative since
Thus, the IR constraint is satisfied for all types t.
3. Let t be an arbitrary type realization. Note that since η j←i ≥ 0, we can bound the payments given by (4.5) by
We have that
Matching up the cases, we get that p i ≥ 0, so payments are nonnegative.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. Consider the distribution of types F with probability mass 1/2 on each of two points: t a = (v 1 , η a 1→ ,t −1 ) and t b = (v 1 , η b 1→ ,t −1 ), wherev 1 ∈ R ≥ 0 andt −1 = (t j : j = 1) take arbitrary, fixed values. Let η a 1→ = (η j←1 : j = 1) and η a 1→ = (η j←1 : j = 1) be such that
For instance, we can take η a 1→ = 0 and η b 1→ = 2v 1 1. Note that ∀x(·) ∈ X BN IC (F ), ∀t ∈ T , x 1 (t) = E[x 1 (t)|t 1 ] =ỹ i (v i ) for some increasing functionỹ i (v i ). However, under distribution F , v i only takes the single valuev i , so the function x 1 (t) must be constant-valued.
Then ∀x(·) ∈ X BN IC (F ), ∀t ∈ T , if x 1 (t) > 0, let y(·) be such that y 1 (t) = 0 and y j (t) = x j (t) for all j = 1. We have that
where the strict inequality follows from (B.2) and that ∀t, x 1 (t) > 0 = y 1 (t). Likewise, if x 1 (t) ≤ 0, let y(·) be such that y 1 (t) = 1 and y j (t) = x j (t) for all j = 1. Then
where the strict inequality follows from (B.1) and that ∀t, x 1 (t) ≤ 0 < 1 = y 1 (t).
Thus, we have shown that for any allocation rule in a BNIC mechanism, there is some type realization such that a different BNIC allocation rule yields a strictly greater social welfare, which is the statement in (4.6).
C Revenue Maximization
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof.
Deriving the Optimal Allocation. We first use the form of the interim payment functions from the BNIC characterization in Proposition 3.5 to express our objective solely in terms of interim allocation functions.
In the last equality, we shifted the lower bound of integration fromt † i to t † i := v i e i − j∈N \iη i←j e j along with the corresponding constant of integration C i to C i . Accordingly, we let t i denote the type (v i , (η i←j ) j =i ), which can be considered the "lowest" type of bidder i, as it yields the lowest valuation on any given allocation over all feasible types. Originally C i = V (t i ;t i ), and now the new constant of integration C i sets the value of V (t i ; t i ). The constant term C i can be set independently of the allocation functions, and we defer finding the optimal such C i (and thus C i ) satisfying IR to the last part of this proof, after we have solved for the optimal allocation rules.
Expanding the inner product in the first term above and ignoring the constant C i , we temporarily take our objective to be
Fix any k ∈ N . We now re-express the above integral term to be linear in y (i) k (t † i ). By Proposition 3.5, y (i) is a conservative vector field, so we can evaluate the line integral by taking any path from
Let us take any path that first fixes the kth coordinate while moving all other coordinates to their final value at the point
, ..., t † i,n ) and then from there moves parallel to the kth coordinate axis to the endpoint t † i . That is, we evaluate the line integral as
Note that the first integral term on the right hand side of (C.2) does not depend on the value of t † i,k . To emphasize this fact, we temporarily denote this quantity by
Next, we use the assumption of independence of the components of t † i to evaluate the expectation of the second term on the right hand side of (C.2):
The first equality follows by definition of expectation and by the independence of the coordinates of t † i , the second by changing the order of integration, the third by definition of the CDF, and the fourth by the definition of expectation once again.
Plugging the last expression and (C.3) back into the objective (C.1), we get
where we rearrange terms to arrive at the first equality, use the definition of interim allocation for the second, and the law of total expectation and linearity of expectation for the last equality. Note that neither the allocation function x k nor any of the interim allocations y (i) k to bidder k, for i ∈ N , feature in the second expectation term. There are also no coupling constraints between the allocations x k and x j for j = k. Since we have expressed the objective as linear in x k (t), the optimal allocation rule x k (t) can thus be read off as
is the virtual valuation of the parameter t † i,k for i, k ∈ N , and we used the fact that
. Since k was fixed arbitrarily, the form of the optimal allocation rule (C.4) holds for all k ∈ N .
Verifying BNIC. We first show that the interim allocation vector fields y (i) are monotone. Note that for k ∈ N , the allocation functions x k (t) are only dependent on t † i,k , for all i ∈ N . Further, y
only depends on the parameter t † i,k . Given this, letỹ i k be a single-parameter, increasing function such that y (i)
The inequality holds because each term in the sum is nonnegative, sinceỹ i k are increasing functions.
Next, note that the functionsỹ i k are integrable, and let
It can be checked that y (i) is the gradient of potential function Y (i) . Thus, the vector fields y (i) are conservative.
IR and the Optimal Payment.
Finally, we consider the interim IR constraint and the optimal constant term of the payment function. By Proposition 3.6, the optimal outside option is to allocate x j = 1 to all bidders j ∈ N \i when bidder i does not participate and it suffices to check interim IR for the typet i = (v i , η i← ). That is, interim IR given the optimal outside option is equivalent to having
Maximizing revenue corresponds to maximizing the expected sum of the interim payments q i (t i ) and thus of minimizing V i (t i ;t i ). Hence, in the revenue-maximizing auction, we set the constant C i in the payment function to be − j∈N \i η i←j . Recall that we re-expressed our objective function in terms of the constant C i = V i (t i ; t i ), which is fully determined by the interim allocation rule y (i) given above and C i . Thus the corresponding optimal constant C i that yields an IR mechanism is
By construction, our payment rule satisfies the BNIC characterization of Proposition 3.5, so our overall mechanism is BNIC and interim IR.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof. We consider a mechanism (x, p) and use the BNIC characterization of Proposition 3.7. In particular, recall that there exists a non-decreasing function y i such that y i (t) = y i (v i ), where y i is the interim allocation. Plugging in the form of interim payments q i given by (3.2) we get
(C.5) Observe that the last term on the right-hand side is independent of the choice of (x, p) and can thus be ignored when searching for the revenue optimal auction.
For the second term, swapping the order of integration gives
For the third term, we write
where the first, third and last equality use the law of total expectation, the second equality is just a change of index and the penultimate is by definition of y i .
Combining the previous derivations, we get that the revenue maximizing problem is equivalent to maximizing
where y i is the interim allocation computed from x i and must be non-decreasing by Proposition 3.7. Hence, we see that the objective function as well as the BNIC and IR constraints can be written solely in terms of the functions ( y i ) i∈N . It is thus sufficient to optimize over them separately, under the constraint that y i be non-decreasing and [0, 1]-valued. Given an optimal choice of (y i ) i∈N , we can then define x i and p i as in the proposition statement.
To complete the proof we need to choose the smallest V i ((v i , η ←i ); (v i , η ←i )) in (C.5) such that interim IR is satisfied. By Proposition 3.8, it suffices to set V i ((v i , η ←i ); (v i , η ←i )) to be the lowest interim utility a bidder could get in any outside option, which is exactly
D Welfare versus Revenue Maximization in Scenario 1
As stated in section 5.1, given a distribution function F i←j and corresponding density function f i←j for η i←j on [η i←j ,η i←j ], for i = j ∈ N , we define the distribution of t † i,j on [−η i←j , −η i←j ] by the distribution and density functions
Further, ∀i, j ∈ N , we define the virtual value functions Φ i,
. Then ∀i ∈ N and j ∈ N \i, we can express the virtual functions as
Suppose all v i , η i←j for i ∈ N, j ∈ N \i are uniformly distributed on their respective domains. The virtual value functions take the forms
The optimal allocation rule 5.2 then becomes
In the case of n = 2 bidders, bidder 1's allocation is
Meanwhile, the welfare-maximizing allocation rule for bidder 1 is
Thus, the revenue-maximizing allocation allocates to bidders less often than does the welfaremaximizing allocation. The optimal mechanism therefore is not in general efficient. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , where the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing allocations are shown to partition the type space for t into the regions based on bidder 1's allocation.
E Learning
A natural concern with the optimal mechanisms described in Section 5 is that they rely on the knowledge of the type distribution. For example, even in the regular case of Corollary 5.6, the threshold value τ i of bidder i is described as the zero of the virtual value function which itself depends heavily on the distribution of the type of bidder i. In this section, we explore a situation where the type distribution is initially unknown by the mechanism designer and learned over time.
E.1 Problem description
We consider a sequential learning setting in which at each time step, the seller attempts to sell a digital good in an auction with n buyers whose types are drawn from an unknown distribution. The task of the seller is to design an auction mechanism to both satisfy the BNIC and IR constraints at each time step, and also learn the unknown distribution over time and converge to the optimal auction. Specifically, at time step k ≥ 1:
1. the data seller announces the BNIC and IR mechanism µ k = x k (·), p k (·)) which will be used for this time step;
2. a vector of types t k ∈ T is drawn from the distribution f independently of previous time steps;
3. the good is allocated according to x(t) and the seller collects the payments p(t).
We emphasize that the underlying distribution f from which the types are drawn is unknown to the seller and so µ k cannot depend directly on it. However, the seller observes the types reported in previous time steps and can use these observations to inform the design of x k (·) and p k (·). A natural benchmark to evaluate the performance of the chosen sequence of mechanisms is to compare its cumulative revenue to the one which would have been obtained using the optimal auction. Formally, let x (·) and p (·) denote the revenue-optimal BNIC and IR auction-which depends on the distribution f -and define the regret up to time step K by
Rev(x , p ) − Rev(x k , p k ) , K ≥ 1 .
The goal of the data seller is thus to design a sequence of mechanisms which incurs as small a regret as possible.
Remark E.1. An important assumption in this sequential learning setting is that the buyers' types are redrawn at each time step from the same distribution and that buyers only strategize within each time step (hence the BNIC and IR constraints) but not across times steps. As such, we ignore intertemporal incentive issues, which could for example lead buyers to misreport their types in order to bias the learning of the distribution that the seller performs over time. We note that an alternative learning model would consider a single-shot auction in which buyers' types are drawn from identical distributions. In this case, one can still hope to learn the type distribution in a single time step as the number of buyers n goes to infinity. The problem of buyers misreporting their types can be addressed by learning the unknown distribution from a subsample S ⊂ N of the buyers and then using the learned mechanism only on the remaining N \S buyers. This approach was for example adopted in [GHK + 06].
E.2 A stochastic optimization solution
We now provide a solution to the sequential learning problem of Section E.1 which leverages the specific structure of the optimal mechanism described in Section 5.2. We will make the following two simplifying assumptions:
• for each buyer i, the distribution of her value v i is independent from the distribution of externalities η ←i she causes on others. Furthermore, for all i and j ∈ N \i, the expectation E[η i←j ] is known to the seller;
• for each buyer i, the function v
Under these assumptions, Corollary 5.6 combined with Example 5.8 imply that the revenueoptimal BNIC and IR mechanism is given by
where the vector τ of optimal thresholds is described in Corollary 5.6. A simple computation further implies that
This formula has a number of important consequences. First, observe that the mechanism obtained by replacing τ by any other vector of thresholds τ is also BNIC and IR. Since the optimal mechanism is given by the choice of τ , optimizing the function H over the choice of τ ∈ i∈N [v i ,v i ] is sufficient to obtain the optimal mechanism. In other words, the problem of finding the optimal mechanism reduces to the optimization of the function H. Furthermore, note that this maximization problem is separable: denoting by H i the summand in (E.1) we have that H(τ ) = i∈N H i (τ i ) and hence, the problem reduces to separately maximizing each function H i over the choice of a single-dimension parameter τ i . Finally, observe that the derivative of H i is h i (τ i ) := 1 − τ i g i (τ i ) − G i (τ i ) − g i (τ i ) j∈N \i E[η j←i ] which is non-increasing by assumption. Hence, the function H i is concave.
Learning as stochastic optimization. The previous observations suggest a natural strategy to learn the optimal auction in the observational model described in Section E.1: using a sequence of posted price mechanisms and iteratively updating the thresholds based on the buyers' decisions.
Note that when using a posted price mechanism with threshold τ k i at time step k, the only thing we observe from buyer k is her decision to accept or reject the offer, which is the binary random variable X k i := 1{v k i ≥ τ k i }. Hence, the suggested strategy does not even require the buyers to report their entire type but simply relies on the binary observations (X k i ) i∈N from each time step. From these observations, one can form for each i ∈ N , the quantity
which is an unbiased estimate of H i (τ k i ), that is, H i (τ k i ) = E H i (τ k i , X k i )]. This observation conveniently reduces the problem of learning the optimal mechanism to the one of maximizing for each i ∈ N the concave function H i (·) assuming access to unbiased estimates of H i (τ k i ) for a sequence τ k i of our choice. This problem is exactly what is known in the online learning literature as a stochastic derivative-free optimization problem where the quantity H i (τ k i , X k i ) plays the role of a zeroth 2 order stochastic oracle. Algorithms for stochastic derivative-free optimizations usually take the form of iterative algorithms in which at each time step, the current estimate of the optimal solution is updated based on the previous estimate and the current observation. In our notations, we write:
where Update(·) is the update rule given by a stochastic optimization algorithm. We instantiate the stochastic optimization framework in our setting and describe in Algorithm 1 a meta algorithm parametrized by a generic Update function.
All that remains to do to obtain a concrete bound on the regret of our learning procedure is to choose an Update(·) function from the stochastic optimization literature. Here, we will not aim for optimal bounds but rather give a simple example of how to instantiate Algorithm 1. A common idea is to estimate the derivative of the objective H i at τ i by H i (τ i + δu)u where u is uniformly random over [−1, 1]. Using this estimate of the derivative in projected gradient-ascent suggests the following simple update rule:
where u is uniformly random over [−1, 1] and γ is the step size parameter. By applying a standard result (see e.g.
[FKM05]) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition E.2. For any K ≥ 1, there exists a choice of δ and γ such that using the update rule (E.2) in Algorithm 1 yields a regret R(K) = O(K 3/4 ).
Furthermore, since the revenue is a concave function of the chosen threshold, we recover the standard fact that a bound on the regret implies a bound on the objective function.
